Review vol. XXVIII
no. 2 (Summer–Fall 2008)
Beyond SAIS
Rationalism
and Instrumentalism
79

Beyond Rationalism and
Instrumentalism: The Case
for Rethinking U.S. Engagement
with International Law and
Organization
Peter G. Danchin
Today it’s become fashionable to disparage the United Nations . . . and other international
organizations. In fact, reform of these bodies is urgently needed if they are to keep pace with
the fast-moving threats we face. Such real reform will not come, however, by dismissing the
value of these institutions, or by bullying other countries to ratify changes we have drafted
in isolation. Real reform will come because we convince others that they too have a stake in
change—that such reforms will make their world, and not just ours, more secure.1

Introduction
Like Odysseus seeking to navigate his ship through the perilous Strait of
Messina, international law and organization has for the last seven years
been caught between two seemingly inescapable perils: on the one side, the
Scylla of unparalleled American military and economic dominance; on the
other, the Charybdis of a rationally reconstructed and purportedly universally authoritative morality. The details are by now well-known. The former
has manifested itself in a series of foreign policy maneuvers characterized
by unilateralism and militarism: the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq; the
initiation of an amorphous global war on terrorism; and strident opposition
to any international legal regime or institution perceived to impose limits
on American liberty of action.2 The latter has been articulated in varying
forms of neoconservative ideology and is today perhaps best reflected in
the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy which declares that the values of
freedom, democracy, and free enterprise are “right and true for every person,
in every society” and that “the duty of protecting these values against their
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enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people across the globe
and across the ages.”3
The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 vividly illustrated the
interrelationship between these two forms of politics. The war split the
Security Council, divided NATO, and sent tremors through both the UN
and leading capitals. To much of the world, this kind of unilateral military
action violated both the rules and underlying logic of the UN Charter, paramount among which is the aim “to save succeeding generations from the
scourge of war.” Such a perspective rests on a particular conception of world
order: a formalist vision of multilateral cooperation and collective security
and a resulting politics of international law premised on the Grundnorm of
sovereign equality.4 To the United States, however, this overly legalistic view
is simultaneously too constraining and insufficiently normative. Why, for
example, should a formal legal principle such as sovereign equality or the
prohibition on the use of force between states5 shield a rogue state which
transparently poses a threat not only to other states but to its own people?
Conversely, who can argue with action taken to promote the ideals of freedom, democracy and free enterprise, universal values self-evidently “right
and true for every person, in every society”? From this perspective, world order looks rather different. As against an imagined international community
subject to a utopian rule of law, there is instead a Great Power (or coalition
of such powers) presiding over a civilized core of nations preemptively on
guard against a shadowy periphery of rogue states and non-state outlaws.
This is not a politics of law, but a politics of morality which rests for its
ultimate justification on moral claims and which manifests itself in a series
of us/them, good/evil, center/periphery dichotomies.6
In this Essay, I seek to advance an argument for rethinking the current terms of engagement of U.S. foreign policy with international law and
institutions. My primary contention is that doing so offers a preferable path
to the current two extremes of power politics and imperial moralizing. This
is for two reasons. First, it is necessary to distinguish between force and the
status of political domination on the one hand, and consensus and the status of normative meaning on the other. While it may be possible for a single
superpower to exercise factual authority and control over foreign states and
peoples through sheer assertions of force and will, the attainability of such
a situation should not be confused with the ideals of justice or political
community. At bottom, the move from Realpolitik to legal formalism rests
on a simple idea: while certain views of the good may reasonably be denied,
it is inherently unreasonable to deny the autonomy of others as “reasongiving” and “reason-receiving” subjects. In the absence of a basic “right to
justification,” inherently-contested questions of how it may be possible to
conceive and organize an international political community do not arise.
To appreciate why such a notion of mutual respect should commend itself
to us, we must first understand how and why current rationalistic accounts
of state interests and state freedom are inherently unreasonable. Second,
and as a corollary to this, in asserting any claim to “universal right” the
boundaries and finitude of all forms of modern natural law reasoning must
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be acknowledged. The unavoidability of pluralism and reasonable disagreement argues for a form of social ethics, i.e. the idea that all moral norms be
intersubjectively contested and justified. The first argument explains and
justifies the move to international law; the second explains and justifies the
need for international regimes and institutions.
Rationalism and International Law
The deep skepticism of the current Administration toward international
law qua law is hardly unprecedented in U.S. foreign policy. Ever since Hans
Morgenthau and the influential work of the “realist” school in international
relations beginning in the 1940s, doubts have been expressed whether international law is really “law” properly understood.7 To the extent international
law exists, general skepticism regarding its practical utility has been the
dominant school of thought and a discernable pragmatism has influenced
the conduct of foreign relations as the U.S. has sought to shape international law and organization to accord with its vision of American national
interests. This was especially the case during the 1990s when, as the sole
superpower at the end of the Cold War, the U.S. found it comparatively
easier to reshape international norms and institutions to conform with its
ideological and foreign policy preferences. Consistent through all this time
has been an implicit rejection of the function of international law in terms
of some notion of the Rule of Law in the conduct of international relations
and thus of international law as a meaningful constraint on the policies,
behavior and responsibilities of states.8 In this respect, what distinguishes
the philosophy of the Bush Administration is merely the stridency of its
tone and the dogmatic insistence on the irrelevance at best, and danger at
worst, of international law to vital U.S. national interests.9
What is striking today, however, is the prominence of conservative
international legal scholars who now argue that views such as Bolton’s are
not only descriptively accurate, but normatively justifiable: international law
imposes no moral obligation on states; states thus have the right to place
their sovereign interests first when self-interested calculations indicate to do
so, even if this means departing from international law; and liberal democratic states are even obligated to do so and to follow the dictates of their own
people rather than some abstract cosmopolitan duty.10 As suggested above,
this may well describe the actual flexibility and freedom of action open to
the world’s single superpower in its decision-making, although even descriptively such an account is arguably incomplete and overly reductionist.11 But
why, as a normative matter, should a state’s rational self-interest be understood automatically to trump competing notions of say objective morality or
the various potential reasonable claims of others? In particular, why should
this be so when legal positivists have always argued that international law
is itself the product of states’ rational self-interest but nonetheless binds
those states which have consented to it?12 What particular conception of
rationality is at work here?
The case for international law and organization rests on the merits
of the response to these questions. My central claim is that this account of

82

SAIS Review Summer–Fall 2008

rationality is not only inherently unreasonable, but in fact impossible. At its
core it rests on a species of skepticism which challenges the objective nature
of morality, indeed the very possibility of moral obligation itself. It concedes
a degree of objectivity to “descriptive” claims regarding, say, state behavior
or state interests, but it denies any objective validity to “evaluative” moral
or ethical claims. This skepticism owes its appeal to a naturalistic world
picture in which humans, including their interactions and moral judgments, are surveyed as part of the natural material world. A moral claim, for
example that genocide is wrong, is not a claim to objective Truth but only
the expression of a certain emotive or mental attitude, or perhaps a social
norm accepted by a particular group or society. However expressed—and
there are many versions of this anti-objectivist view—the critical move is to
take a position outside of or external to morality.
As many contemporary philosophers have argued, this is simply impossible: however one may try to step outside of morality and view it as part
of the natural order, moral questions simply repose themselves and cannot
be avoided.13 What such “archimedean” skeptical accounts seek to do is to
justify their claims (i.e. that moral or ethical judgments cannot provide
objective truth) from premises that are “not themselves evaluative.”14 But
the insuperable difficulty is that all denials of the objective Truth of moral
judgments themselves imply moral judgments. Is genocide really permissible
if State A says that it is or if the society in State A holds it to be acceptable
in certain situations? My ability to accept or reject this proposition necessarily engages my moral beliefs and cannot be decided exclusively from a
naturalistic position external to morality. As Thomas Nagel has recently
argued, however much I may try to assume an external position, I am propelled into a moral stance which it turns out is very difficult to occupy.15
In this respect, all external skeptics are committed to some first order moral
judgments; either that or they must deny basic moral claims in a way that
is morally difficult to accept.
External skepticism has a long and complex history as regards the
question of the basis of obligation in international law. For any legal thinker
schooled in the post-enlightenment secular society of the West, the orgins
of this story are usually traced back to the Peace of Wesphalia in 1648 and
the rise of the idea of social contract. The Westphalian moment is said to
mark the “great epistemological break” when religious medieval “unity”
gave way to a secular system of “plural” territorially-limited sovereign states
leading to the emergence between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries of
what Koskenniemi has termed the “liberal doctrine of politics,” the driving
force of which was the attempt to “escape the anarchical conclusions to
which loss of faith in an overriding theologico-moral world order otherwise
seemed to lead.”16 The myth postulates free and independent if still vulnerable “states” which voluntarily trade some of their autonomy for a measure
of collective security. The myth thus makes the collective arrangement of a
“community of States” or “international community” the product of individual choice and thus secondary to the autonomy of the individual. The
“rights” or “sovereignty” of states are the fundamental category because

Beyond Rationalism and Instrumentalism

83

“it is the normative category which most nearly approximates that which
is the source of the legitimacy of everything else.”17 While some sovereign
rights are given up for collective security, other rights are retained and at
least some of these are “inalienable.”
The critical point to note here is that all accounts of obligation in
the liberal tradition involve elements of both voluntarism and rationalism. The puzzle of “why nations obey” has never been a question about the
consensual basis of international law, but rather about how the normativity
of law creates distance between itself and the behavior, will and interest
of States. This question remains essentially- and widely-contested today
with many so-called “compliance” theories variously grounded in notions
of rationalistic instrumentalism,18 Kantian liberalism,19 social constructivism,20 and international legal process21 struggling for predominance. In each
case, an “ascending” strand of argument is posited based on the “factual”
behavior, will and interest of States and thus all these accounts derive their
authority from individual consent. But in each case, there is also a relevant
“descending” strand of argument which is based on varying notions of
justice, common interests, progress, the nature of the international community or similar ideas which justify certain limitations or constraints on
the behavior of States, what it is they may reasonably will, or what their
legitimate interests can be.22 It has been the continuing struggle to reconcile
these two strands of argument which tells the story of modern international
law with each competing conception of and interrelationship between state
“sovereignty” and “social contract” yielding different configurations of both
community and autonomy.
However we proceed then, we cannot avoid the deep and complex
problems raised by the relationship of morality to law. Even if we start from
the premise that morality concerns only the internal perspective that the
individual adopts regarding her relationship to others and thus concede
that the emergence of and respect for law does not necessarily require the
individual to internalize the interests of others (i.e. even if we accept that
morality is thoroughly selfish), law may nonetheless emerge from a purely
introspective self-interested conception of morality if the individual realizes that she alone cannot be safe because she is not omnipotent. As long
as she will have to compete with others, and as long as she cannot always
be certain she will prevail, there are inherent incentives for her to subjugate
her preference (and redefine her self-interest) for immediate satisfaction to
her longer-term interest of self-preservation.
This was Hobbes’s basic explanation of how law arises and why persons
and States can and do enter into forms of cooperation and coordination
with each other.23 But even the strongly positivistic structure of Hobbes’s argument was simultaneously ascending and descending. While it began from
the assumed non-existence of a constraining natural law so as to posit an
(ascending) justification of social order by reference to individual ends, this
was inextricably associated with a (descending) construction of these ends
in terms of an overriding need for security or what we might term a “natural right of self-preservation.”24 The question then became what account
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of objective interests based on the natural right of self-preservation could
be advanced in order to allow for the overriding of particular individual
ends. Hobbes’s wide conception of tacit consent allowed him to formulate
a theory where private rights and the absolutism of the Leviathan could coexist. Like Grotius, he viewed man’s natural state as giving rise to a minimal
sense of mutual respect and sociability, but unlike Grotius he believed that
this “minimal natural morality was not sufficient to prevent conflict, since
there was no objective criterion for determining what is necessary for our
preservation.”25 Unsurprisingly, later theorists in the liberal tradition such
as Pufendorf, Locke, and Vattel would advance strikingly divergent accounts
to Hobbes of the relationship between freedom and social order.26
Even the most minimal accounts of the relationship between law and
morality thus rest in this respect on some notion of natural right or objective morality which seeks to shape and limit what we mean by the terms
“rationality” or “rational self-interest”. The critical point then is that denials
of the existence of objective truth in a given domain cannot be established
outside of that domain. Skeptical rationalism must therefore contend with
the countervailing force of the judgments in the domain it is trying to devalue. How this argument will be resolved will thus be determined, at least
in part, by the answer to internal questions. Reflection upon these internal
questions will show that solely instrumental rationalistic arguments which
seek to abandon moral truth claims altogether are unreasonable. This point
was made powerfully by John Rawls in his final work The Law of Peoples in
which he drew a basic distinction between the character of “States” on the
one hand and “Peoples” on the other:
How far states differ from peoples rests on how rationality, the concern
with power, and a state’s basic interests are filled in. If rationality excludes
the reasonable (that is, if a state is moved by the aims it has and ignores the
criterion of reciprocity in dealing with other societies); if a state’s concern
with power is predominant; and if its interests include such things as converting other societies to the state’s religion, enlarging its empire and winning territory, gaining dynastic or imperial or national prestige and glory,
and increasing its relative economic strength—then the difference between
states and peoples is enormous. Such interests as these tend to put a state
at odds with other states and peoples and to threaten their safety and security, whether they are expansionist or not. The background conditions also
threaten hegemonic war.27

For Rawlsians in the social contract tradition, the idea that peoples limit
their basic interests as required by the reasonable demands of others is thus the
necessary premise for the move from unbounded self-interest to binding
law. This view is premised on a duty to recognize the autonomy of others
and to adopt an attitude of mutual respect. Rational choice is understood
to be limited and constrained by the notion of reasonableness in the sense
of reciprocity and the offering of fair terms of cooperation to others. This
is an inherently intersubjective and dialogic undertaking: the limits which
reasonableness imposes on rational self-interest cannot be established unilaterally or in a vacuum; they need to be worked out in conversation and
dialogue with others.
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In a vastly pluralistic world of different peoples, religions, cultures,
languages, ideologies and ways of life, the function of international law is
thus to allow the international political community to mediate conflicting interests and values on agreed terms. As argued below, it is this basic
philosophy which underlies the United Nations Charter and post-Second
World War attempts to forge a liberal international legal order. How the
material content and scope of that law is to be worked out is, of course, essentially-contested. But the need and justification for an agreed system of
rules and norms between differently-situated states and peoples rests on the
cogency of this moral premise, whether this be in the communitarian and
universalistic tradition of Rawls or the autonomy-oriented and positivistic
tradition of Hobbes.
This formidable and arguably improbable task is facilitated by the
technique of legal formalism. As suggested by Koskenniemi, international
law provides the “‘flat substanceless surface’ [which] expresses the universalist principle of inclusion at the outset and makes possible the regulative
ideal of a pluralistic international world.” This is absolutely critical as the
form of the law
constructs political adversaries as equals, entitled to express their subjectively
felt injustices in terms of breaches of the rules of the community to which
they belong no less than their adversaries—thus affirming both that inclusion
and the principle that the conditions applying to the treatment of any one
member of the community must apply to every other member as well.28

In any decision to attach meaning to legal norms, sovereign equality means
that states are entitled as of right to articulate their interpretations on conditions of equal standing. They are thus included in the “normative universe
as subjects of rights and duties or carriers of distinct identities”. It is only
because the regime comprises noninstrumental rules (i.e. “understood to be
authoritative independent of particular beliefs or purposes”) that the freedom of its subjects to be different becomes possible.29 This is the essential
idea, what we might term the “gift of formalism.”30
On this view, international law is best understood as a project to reach
political settlements and forms of reconciliation between the conflicting
claims to freedom of differently-situated subjects and the divergent assertions of right and justice to which they continually give rise. If political
power is to be exercised in the name of some common social endsay to
protect international peace, or security, or justicesuch that the sovereignty
of a particular State or States is to be limited, then that exercise of power
must be done according to legal norms and thereby justified to the State
or States so affected. This remains the case even though States may differ
greatly in their comprehensive views about the good and true way of life. In
this respect, the animating virtues of the modern view are notions of peace,
toleration and value pluralism.31
How then does this conception of international law differ from that
advanced by contemporary rational choice theorists such as Jack Goldsmith
and Eric Posner? Here it is important to distinguish analytically between
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the descriptive and normative claims at issue. For it is only if we do so, that
we can appreciate both the causes and consequences of the current two
extremes of power politics and imperial moralizing in U.S. foreign policy.
First, as noted above, rational choice theory is premised as a descriptive
matter on the unfettered freedom of choice of States in the conduct of their
international relations.32 This is an attractive and logical position for powerful states, even more so for the world’s single remaining superpower. But it
fails to address the normative or “descending” question of how or on what
grounds a State’s liberty of action should, if ever, be subject to limitation or
constraint. Even for a superpower, the normative logic of the Hobbesian
argument needs to be addressed: i.e. the normative claim that voluntary
cooperation between States is a demand of rationality itself because it is in
their long-term or “enlightened” self-interest.
Second, however, rational choice theorists are not silent on the normative dimensions of international law. Rather, many in fact advance a thick
and substantive “descending” argument of their own: i.e., again as noted
above, not only do States have the right to place their sovereign interests
first, but liberal democratic states even have an obligation to do so.33 As a
matter of international law, this is a striking prescriptively normative claim
premised on deeply contested notions of Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment conceptions of individual autonomy and democratic theory. Indeed,
it was the intractable nature of claims of this very kind that eventually led
Rawls to distinguish between a political conception of justice on the one
hand and a comprehensive philosophical doctrine on the other.34 And it
was this very issue that led Rawls late in his life to reject any comprehensive
liberal notion of global cosmopolitan justice in international law and to
distinguish between “liberal” rights on the one hand and a more minimal
conception of “human” rights on the other.35 Not only is the rationalist
conception of what we might call the autonomous or “choosing” agent a
comprehensive (and culturally contingent) moral claim, it also functions
in Western normative legal discourse as a maximalist restriction and constraint on the autonomy of individuals, groups and States adhering to or
advancing competing conceptions of the relationship between individual
freedom and social order.
The dramatic reduction and limitation on freedom resulting from
such claims are less visible in societies, political traditions and academic
cultures such as in the U.S. which trace their intellectual origins to eighteenth century notions of reason and personal autonomy. But in many
other diverse States, societies and traditions, this account of a supposedly
“universal rationality” distinct and independent from any and all convention or custom is seen as highly subjective and imperialistic. Indeed, much
academic work today is devoted to interrogating the limits of rational choice
theory and to challenging more directly the philosophy of history embodied
in the so-called “Enlightenment project.”36 What this work reveals is that
as between the polarized dualism in modern political thought of moral
universalism and cultural relativism, there is a third intersubjective position which denies that relativism is the only alternative to universalism: the
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idea of value pluralism. Nowhere is this more evident than in contemporary
debates and struggles over the meaning and application of (universal) human rights norms. It is to this issue that we now turn.
37

Instrumentalism and International Organization
The idea of legal formalism as a means to promote and secure the ideals
of peace, toleration and value pluralism is an attractive picture so far as it
goes. The difficulty, however, is that any argument for such a formal view is
ambiguous. Formal legal norms are always suspended precariously between
two other virtues which international law simultaneously seeks to incorporate and mediate: the seemingly opposing ideas of justice and consent. On
their own, these two further virtues appear to threaten the coherence of
international law qua law: justice because it substitutes vague and subjective
ideas about international morality for the rules actually obtaining between
states;38 consent because it identifies international law primarily with State
will thus making it only external municipal law.39 The genius and paradox
of international law is that it tries valiantly to maintain its autonomy qua
law by seeking to reconcile these seeming opposites within a single form. It
does so in two ways: first, by positing a social ethics (formal positivism) expressing the freedom of each State as a function of community values and
justice;40 second, by positing an individualistic morality (humanistic universalism) which expresses the international community as a function of each
State’s unique identity and awareness.41 This dialectic structure creates the
distinctive double-bind of international legal argument.
In the one case, community is interpreted as negative collectivism and autonomy (independence, self-determination) is presented as the normative goal.
In the other, autonomy is interpreted as negative egoism and community
(integration, solidarity) as what the law should aim at. Neither community
nor autonomy can be exclusive goals. To think of community as the ultimate
goal seems utopian: as there is no agreement on the character of a desirable
community, attempts to impose it seem like imperialism in disguise. To
think of autonomy as the normative aim seems apologist: it strengthens
the absolutist claims of national power-elites and supports their pursuits
at international dominance.42

In this way, each strand of argument generates its opposite within itself.
The humanistic universalism of the communitarian argument is limited
by implicit acknowledgment of the boundaries and finitude of deontological reasoning (whether arrived at from notions of God or Natural Reason)
and thus by the unavoidability of pluralism and reasonable disagreement.
The moral notion of universal right is thus premised on the idea of a social
ethics, i.e. the claim that all moral norms must be intersubjectively contested and justified. In this way, community-oriented arguments contain
within themselves the normative aims of self-determination and may be
constructed without lapsing into totalitarianism. Conversely, the formal
positivism (or legal formalism) of the autonomy argument is premised on
a moral idea: the duty to respect the autonomy of others as “reason-giving”
and “reason-receiving” subjects. This idea underlies the universal norm of
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inclusion and formal status as a legal subject in the first place. In this way,
autonomy-oriented arguments contain within themselves the normative
aims of communal integration and solidarity and may be constructed without degenerating into unlimited egoism.
The international legal project is driven by this dialectic which creates
a dynamics of contradiction and constant oscillation between patterns of
argument seeking to legitimate social order against individual freedom.
The result is that international law—and its actual application and practice
in and by international organizations—provides a site of deliberation and
contestation which opens a possible pathway by which to transcend the twin
dangers of power politics and imperial moralizing discussed above.
In order to illustrate the point, let’s consider the idea of fundamental
or “universal” human rights—a notion today deeply embedded in the modern structure of international law and international relations.43 What is
the source of this law? In the case of core human rights treaties such as the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights and the Conventions against Genocide and Torture,
the legal validity of the relevant norms is the consent of the member states
themselves. The act of state acceptance by ratification of the treaty unites
the ideas of consent and justice: a material norm such as to free speech or
freedom of religion is thereby transformed into a legal norm which in turn
creates corresponding rights and duties both as between and within the
states parties to the convention. This is what I mean by the social ethics of
formal positivism, the key point of which is the need to engage with others
as equals in the pursuit of a normative consensus reflected in law. This does
not eliminate power politics, but it does ensure that powerful states need to
obtain the agreement of less-powerful states for any putative international
regime or normative framework.
But what if State A asserts that certain religious or cultural norms are
the exclusive basis or “source” for any legal rule on human rights acceptable
to that society and thus that further deliberation on at least some norms
is fruitless? Or, conversely, State B asserts that its sovereignty is subject to
no external limit other than that to which it expressly consents and thus
that it too rejects certain norms? In each case, a gap is now evident between
consent and justice with the result that both the integrity and universality
of the law is threatened. How is this impasse to be resolved? These questions
compel us to look behind the “formal validity” or “binding force” of legal
norms and to consider the purpose of or reasons justifying such norms.44 In
so doing, we implicitly acknowledge that no formal doctrine of sources of
human rights in international law is capable of excluding political considerations, and no doctrinal theory of human rights law can be advanced that is
entirely disconnected or “external” to the actually-existing interests, values
and ends of differently-situated States and Peoples.45 This is what I mean
by an individualistic morality of humanistic universalism, the key point being the need to recognize the limits of any particular conception of justice,
and the need to justify any instrumentalist claim regarding the substantive
meaning of materials norms of justice. As above, this does not eliminate
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imperial moralizing, but it at least lessens the likelihood of international law
becoming no more than an apology for the (contested) interests or ends of
powerful States and thus legitimizing force as “enforcement” in a manner
that conflicts directly with target States’ self-understanding.
The Example of International Human Rights
Both of these dynamics have played out in spectacular terms in the field
of human rights in recent years. Indeed, the strength of the argument for
rethinking U.S. engagement with international law and organization is
best appreciated here. This is possible, however, only once we recognize
that the view of instrumental rationalism discussed in Part I itself rests
on essentially-contested (i.e. subjective) normative premises. In particular,
it is now commonplace in U.S. foreign policy to equate rational self-interest with the basic tenets of a liberal democratic regime. To the extent international law is said to exist, it is thought to apply only or primarily as
between liberal democratic states.46 On this basis, the traditional attributes
of state sovereigntypolitical independence, autonomy, dignity, territorial
integrityare viewed merely as legal forms. What really counts is whether
they help or hinder certain (as-yet unspecified) objectives, values or ends.47
Do such formal rules stand in the way, for example, of protecting fundamental norms of liberal democracy and human rights? Do they shield undemocratic states which lack a system of government based on free periodic
elections and are unaccountable to their citizens? Do they shield also illiberal
states which fail to offer their citizens individual rights?
Missing from this argument is the notion of formal legal subjecthood—of the “state” as opposed to the “liberal democratic state” as the
subject of international law. The defining feature of this view is the notion
that the internal characteristics of a state determine its standing in the family of nations.48 Undemocratic, illiberal, or so-called “rogue” states such as
Iraq, Iran or Cuba are not to be regarded as full members of international
society and are seen to lie outside of the “zone of law.”49 Like the history of
colonialism by European nation-states during the nineteenth century, force
may therefore be required to transform or “civilize” the internal identity
of such states in order to bring them into the community of democratic
nations. While terms such as “civilized,” “non-civilized,” and “barbarian”
distinguished states in the 19th and early 20th centuries on the basis of an
equation between Christianity and the highest forms of civilization, today
the “democratic,” “non-democratic,” and “rogue” state distinctions rest on
a purportedly universal theory which finds its origins in Enlightenment
notions of individual autonomy and popular sovereignty. Such norms, by
definition, lie beyond consent and thus rest on premises which are not themselves open to evaluation. This is precisely the type of hegemonic move
which legal formalism, with its underlying rationale of liberal toleration
and political inclusion, seeks (and arguably is able) to prevent.50
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From Human Rights Commission to Council
We can see this by examining the way in which the mere existence of an
international institution such as the UN Commission on Human Rights
provides the necessary political space for material norms of this kind to
be contested intersubjectively. A cursory review of the instruments and
declarations emerging from this intergovernmental body over the last
half-century reveals the inherently instrumentalist and subjective nature
of U.S. human rights policy in the post-war era. Despite early leadership in
the drafting of the Universal Declaration and the two Covenants, the U.S.
is today party to strikingly few human rights treaties and even then these
have been ratified subject to extensive reservations, declarations, and understandings preventing any noticeable domestic effect (“non-self-executing”)
and acceding to obligations already coincident with the U.S. Constitution
and laws.51 As Louis Henkin famously put it, the basic philosophy has been
one of international human rights for “export only,” essentially “designed
for other states.”52 Correspondingly, the predominant U.S. criticism of the
UN Human Rights system has been on account of its “toothlessness” and
“ineffectiveness” in enforcing and implementing human rights standards
(so defined) in other parts of the world.
By contrast, the main objections of states in other parts of the world
have not concerned the proposition that civil and political rights are human
rights nor the institutional assertion of multilateral monitoring, reporting and supervisory mechanisms. Rather, states have asserted instead that
the concept of human rights extends beyond civil and political rights and
includes notions of economic, social and cultural rights (including “collective” rights) and further that where states are to be subject to international rights-based regimes this must be on the basis of considerations of
reciprocity, fairness and equality. To the extent then that international law
and organization has been perceived as a mere instrument for the projection
of the (subjective) ends, policies and interests of powerful Western states,
it has increasingly been met with fierce political counter-mobilization and
resistance. While this dynamic is most evident today amongst states in the
so-called “Muslim world,” it is also clearly visible among coalitions of states
in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
For these reasons, the last annual sessions of the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva increasingly were described as having become “hostage to human rights abusers” and a “forum for defending government’s
records rather than examining them”.53 At the same time, the Commission’s
most effective tool—its capacity to name and shame human rights violators—became dangerously eroded. Acute politicization became evident in
relation to both country situations and thematic areas and a clear north/
south divide created polarized voting on many resolutions. This accelerated
noticeably in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, the bitter cycle
of violence in the Middle East, and the fissures exposed at the World Conference Against Racism in Durban. In 2003, Human Rights Watch went so
far as to observe that an ‘“abusers club’ of governments hostile to human
rights had consolidated its position and blocked several important coun-
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try initiatives, while the United States and to a lesser extent, the European
Union was failing to exert positive leadership”.54
This trend first emerged in May 2001 when in an unprecedented diplomatic fiasco the U.S. was not reelected to a three-year term for the first time
since the Commission’s founding in 1946.55 Having rejoined the Commission in 2003, the U.S. then proceeded to play a largely spoiling role at the
59th session in an effort to defend the prosecution of its unfolding global
war on terrorism and invasion of Iraq.56 But arguably the greatest controversy occurred when Najat Al-Hajjaji of Libya was elected in early 2003 as
the Commission’s Chairperson.57 This prompted the Washington Post angrily to declare that “grotesquely, [the Commission’s] leader will be one of
the charter’s worst violators, a dictatorship with a long record of support
for international terrorism whose treatment of its own people was recently
summed up by Human Rights Watch with a single word: ‘appalling’”.58 This
controversy subsequently sparked an important debate regarding both the
“perverse incentives” for states to join the Commission and the need to introduce minimum membership criteria or “conditionality” requirements of
the sort employed for states seeking entry to membership to the EU. This
debate would in time result in the final abolition of the “discredited” Commission and its replacement by a new Human Rights Council.
The idea of a new UN human rights body to replace the Commission
and stand at the same level as the Security Council and ECOSOC was in
fact first proposed in 2004 by the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel 59
and subsequently endorsed in the 2005 World Summit Outcome document.60 Negotiations then began in earnest among States with the criteria
for membership being the central issue and with little debate regarding
what the Council would actually do once created. Earlier in 2003 the High
Commissioner for Human Rights had proposed that the Commission
should “develop a code of guidelines for access to membership . . . and a
code of conduct for members while they serve on the Commission”.61 Similarly Human Rights Watch had recommended that member states of the
Commission or governments aspiring to membership should be required
to meet the following four minimum criteria: they must (1) ratify and basically observe the six leading human rights treaties; (2) fulfill obligations to
provide reports on their compliance with conventions already ratified; (3)
issue a standing invitation to UN investigators and special rapporteurs; and
(4) not have been condemned by the Commission in the recent past.62
The difficulty with these otherwise sound proposals is that they are
unacceptable to the major powers, especially the United States which is
not itself in compliance with criteria (1) and (3) and is dangerously close to
falling foul of criterion (4). Normative and institutional difficulties such as
these (and importantly also the diplomatic breakdown within the UN Security Council over legal authorization for the war in Iraq) has thus prompted
neo-conservative policymakers to advocate the complete abandonment of
the UN human rights system (new Council or not) and its replacement with
a league or alliance of solely “democratic nations.” As discussed above, this
move would have the effect of breaking the double-bind of international law
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by defining the autonomy or subjecthood of states according to a one-sided,
subjective account of community leaving “non-democratic,” “illiberal,” or
otherwise “rogue” states so defined with two alternatives: either to adopt
the political and economic form of the Anglo-European nation-state as
that “single representative form of humanity,”63 or where necessary to be
compelled by force to do so.64
In the end, the debate over membership criteria for the new Human
Rights Council fell along predictable lines.65 On the one hand, the UN
High-Level Panel and Secretary-General proposed increasing the current
membership of fifty-three states to universal membership as a means to
“de-politicize” the UN’s human rights work and to underscore the commitment of all members states to promote human rights.66 On the other hand,
the United States and its allies also sought to depoliticize and reform the
body but rather by drastically reducing its membership to around twenty
states. As noted by Rajagopal, under this proposal states would be “further
subjected to elimination by strict application of the criterion of liberal democracy, so that member-States would be either from the West or be pliant
allies of the West.”67 The United States also pushed for election of members
by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly and automatic exclusion
of any states subject to coercive measures imposed by the Security Council
(where the United States and the other four permanent members have the
right of veto) for gross human rights violations or acts of terrorism. The
final agreement was a new Council still selected on the basis of geographical representation but reduced to forty-seven members which was achieved
by reducing the number of European states and increasing the number of
African and Asian states.68 With its proposals defeated, the United States
voted against the General Assembly resolution establishing the new Council
and refused to stand for election. The resolution itself was finally adopted
on March 15, 2006 by a vote of 170 in favor, four against.
The debate over membership criteria for the Human Rights Council
reveals both the contested and subjective nature of a particular “rationalist”
account of human rights and the unreasonableness of blunt instrumentalism. The real problem for the U.S. is a human rights body which it is unable
to bend to its will either normatively or institutionally. Again, as observed
by Rajagopal:
When the post Cold War order has come to rest on the idea of human rights,
and its concomitant doctrine of democracy in so many fields of policy from
security to development, the West plausibly needs the human rights organ
of the U.N. to act in ways that provides legitimacy and moral cover for their
actions elsewhere from globalization to the war against Iraq and the war on
terror. . . . The impatience exhibited by the U.S. towards the Council is also
symptomatic of the U.S. attitude towards any international organization
which can, even only in theory, serve as a source of critique of its hegemonic
policies and imperial design.69

The effect of the double-bind of international legal argument as contested
in political bodies such as the Human Rights Council is that powerful states
such as the United States are thereby required to engage with rather than
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simply avoid or unilaterally override the views and demands of other States
and peoples. Increasingly, what this type of political contestation raises
for consideration is an argument like the following: human rights, at least
in the specific form they have assumed in modern international law, have
tainted Western liberal origins; the West embodies a particular legal tradition premised on a stridently individualistic account of moral personality;
and the “universal” rights asserted by powerful states such as the United
States are thus merely another form of Western imperialismuniversalizing
the tenets of a distinct tradition or “being illiberal about being liberal, forcing people to be free.”70
Such arguments challenging the claims to universality of international
human rights law raise difficult questions. But they are questions that
urgently demand our intellectual and practical engagement rather than
arrogant dismissal. David Kennedy, for example, has pointed to the fact
that the idea of human rights has a particular time and place of origin 
“[p]ost-enlightenment, rationalist, secular, Western, modern, capitalist” 
and has therefore argued that, to the extent the international human rights
project is linked to liberal Western ideas about the relationship among law,
politics, and economics, it is itself “part of the problem”.71 In accordance
with its rationalistic underpinnings, the main difficulty is the way that
human rights positions itself as an “emancipatory political project” that
operates outside politics. The implicit logic is that
emancipation means progress forward from the natural passions of politics
into the civilized reason of law. The urgent need to develop a more vigorous
human politics is sidelined . . . [and] [w]ork to develop law comes to be seen
as an emancipatory end in itself, leaving the human rights movement too
ready to articulate problems in political terms and solutions in legal terms.
Precisely the reverse would be more useful.72

From this perspective, the Commission on Human Rights has been
far from a failure; rather it has “provided a very important forum for leveling a moral critique of the world order based on a rejection of colonialism,
racial discrimination and a struggle for equality. . . . [struggles which] form
the roots of the modern human rights movement.”73 This is not to deny,
of course, the intense and often abysmal politics of denial and obfuscation
which shape the proceedings and often poor functioning of the UN human rights bodies and their various ad hoc implementation and monitoring mechanisms. But it is a reason to pause and rethink the full scope and
implications of the politics of human rights at the UN. On a formal legal
or noninstrumental view, the flight from politics in either the form of small
technocratic committees of experts or a strictly limited membership of
similarly-situated states are both, in Kennedy’s words, part of the problem
rather than the solution.
Conclusion
This Essay has sought to rethink two justifications advanced in U.S. foreign
policy for the rejection of international law and organization: one which
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rejects sovereign equality on moral grounds because it places democratic
and rogue states on the same footing; the other which rejects formal legal
norms such as sovereignty and human rights on the basis of a particular
ethical conception of the good. The former threatens international law’s
underlying commitment to value pluralism and its denial of the right of
any one state to impose a single model of political order; the latter results
in imperialism by force. Conversely, the double-bind of international legal
argument and its application and contestation in international organizations seeks to moderate these two extremes on the basis of the claim that
states are both free and unfree at the same time. Like Odysseus self-bound
to his ship’s mast, states are free to find ways and reasons to live with the
Sirensdespite their bad beliefs and the dangers they pose to civilized seafarers. Conversely, states can break the double-bind in one or both of two
ways: by seeking to rule and dominate the Sirens on the basis of a universal
law projected as an object of their own reflection and intentionality; or by
seeking to transform, coerce, or otherwise civilize the Sirens into becoming
members of the civilized community of states.
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